JPRS 76444

18 September 1980

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1534

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

JPRS 76444

18 September 1980

USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1534

CONTENTS

Wartime Operations: Soviet Far East Campaign
(M. Zakharov; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 9, 1960)..... 1

Officers' Technical Training: Views of Tank School Commandant
(V. Kurchavov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Apr 80)..... 17

Military Discipline: Unauthorized Actions Criticized
(A. Drovosekov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Apr 80)..... 21

Military Discipline: Court Martial Described
(V. Filatov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Apr 80)..... 24

Letters to Military Units: Proper Handling Stressed
(A. Sadolin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Apr 80)..... 28

Naval Officer Candidates: Selection Procedures
(A. Kosov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 1 Jun 80)..... 32

Armed Forces: Morale and Combat Readiness Discussed
(A. Milovidov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Jul 80)..... 35

Construction Workers' Day: General Shestopalov Article
(N. F. Shestopalov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Aug 80)..... 42

WARTIME OPERATIONS: SOVIET FAR EAST CAMPAIGN

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, 1960 pp 3-16

[Article by Mar SU M. Zakharov: "The Campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East, 9 August-2 September 1945"]

[Text] Fifteen years ago, on 2 September 1945, World War II came to an end after six years of fighting. By crushing the strongest grouping of Japanese forces, the 1 million-strong Kwantoon Army, in the Far East with a brief campaign the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union hastened the surrender of Japan to the Allied powers and liberated the Northeastern provinces of China and North Korea and the ancient Russian lands of South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands from the Japanese aggressors. The defeat of the Japanese militarists opened a new age in the history of the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia.

The Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan and active participation in it are a model of forthright and conscientious performance of an allied duty. Unlike the United States and England, whose ruling circles frequently and flagrantly violated obligations they had undertaken to open a second front in Europe, the USSR began military operations in the Far East exactly three months after the end of the war with fascist Germany, in conformity with the Yalta agreement.

The campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces against imperialist Japan comprises the strategic offensive in Manchuria, the South Sakhalin operation, and the Kuril landing operation. This truly lightening-fast campaign lasted just 24 days. But in terms of scope, dynamic quality, and final results it is one of the most important campaigns of World War II.

Unfortunately, our military history studies have been completely inadequate in demonstrating the instructive aspects and characteristics of this campaign. In the present article I would like to discuss just a few questions of the art of warfare involved in the organization and conduct of military operations in the Far East. These matters continue to be important under contemporary conditions.

The utter defeat of fascist Germany radically altered the military-political situation in the Far East. Japan was left as the only belligerent country of the fascist bloc, even though it was already greatly weakened from an economic, strategic, and morale standpoint.

The Allied powers, the USSR, United States, who had agreed at the Yalta conference to carry out joint operations in the Far East, could now direct all their efforts against imperialist Japan.

But Japanese ruling circles, disregarding the actual ratio of forces, resolved to continue the war. On 28 July Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki stated the position of the government he headed in the following words: "We will continue our relentless advance toward a successful conclusion of the war."[1] This was a statement of serious intent.

The Japanese militarists adopted a policy of dragging out the war, figuring on a compromise with reactionary circles in the United States and England who were trying to preserve a force hostile to the Soviet Union in the Pacific. The Japanese ruling circles thought that by dragging out the war and playing on the disagreements among the Allied powers they would be able to obtain more or less favorable peace conditions. Guided by this thinking, the Japanese command intended to hold up the Soviet attack for a long time. According to the final version of the strategic plan developed in the spring of 1945, Japanese forces in Manchuria were supposed to offer stubborn resistance to the forces of the Soviet Army in the border regions and then in the mountain ranges that form a large horseshoe-shaped barrier 250-300 kilometers wide blocking all paths from the Mongolian People's Republic, the Transbaikal, the Amur region, and Primor'ye to Central Manchuria. Only in the case of a major success by Soviet forces were the Japanese formations authorized to retreat to the Yanji, Changchun, Mukden, Jinzhou line (see map, next page). The plan contemplated organizing a strong defense to stop the advance of the Soviet Army and keep Southeastern Manchuria and Korea as a base from which to conduct active operations later. For this reason the plan envisioned establishing larger groupings of forces in North Korea and Northern China to counterattack, encircle, and wipe out Soviet forces reaching the central regions of Manchuria.

In view of the characteristics of the theater of military operations the Japanese command concentrated its main forces in Central Manchuria ready to maneuver in any direction. Roughly one-third of the forces were left in the border zone.

The Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea were combined organizationally in the Kwantoon Army commanded by General Otojo Yamada. The headquarters of the army was in Changchun. The Kwantoon Army included the

---

[1] "Istoriya Voyny na Tikhom Okeane" [History of the War in the Pacific], Vol IV, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Inostrannoy literatury, 1958, p 201.



Key:
(a) Front Line on 9 August 1945;
(b) Enemy Troops;
(c) Enemy Fortified Regions;
(d) Directions of Strikes by Soviet Forces;
(e) Position of the Forces of the Fronts on 19 August;
(f) Actions of Forces of Fronts after 19 August;
(g) Airborne Landings;
(h) Directions of of Strikes and Points of Landing of Marine Landing Parties of Pacific Fleet on 19 August;
(i) Naval Actions after 19 August.

1st, 3rd, and (from the beginning of military actions in Manchuria) 17th fronts, the 4th Detached Army, the 2nd and 5th Air Armies, and the Sungari River Naval Flotilla.

The Kwantoon Army had 31 infantry divisions (from 11,000-12,000 to 18,000-21,000 per division), nine infantry brigades (4,500-8,000 men per brigade), one brigade of "special forces" (Kamikaze), two tank brigades, and two air armies. In addition, more than two Japanese armies were located in Northern China, in the Beijing region, and could be moved to Manchuria if necessary. The Japanese command also had at its disposal significant parts of the army of Manchuko, the army of Inner Mongolia, and the Suiyuan army group.

In all, there were 42 infantry divisions, seven calvary divisions, 23 infantry brigades, two tank brigades, and one tank regiment in Manchuria, Korea, South Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands. Their total strength was more than 1.2 million men. The 2nd Air Army, stationed in Manchuria, had up to 1,200 aircraft, and the 5th Air Army in Korea had up to 600.

The Soviet Armed Forces began preparations for the campaign in the Far East immediately after the surrender of fascist Germany. It was decided to use three fronts for this campaign: the Transbaikal, the 1st Far Eastern, and the 2nd Far Eastern, as well as the Pacific Ocean Fleet and the Red Banner Amur River Flotilla. Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy was named commander of Soviet forces in the Far East.

Considering that Soviet forces stationed in the Far East might be inadequate to crush the Kwantoon Army quickly, between May and July 1945 the Soviet Supreme High Command carried out a major regrouping of forces from the West to the East. Two front directorates, from the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the former Karelian Front were sent there along with a significant number of troops.

The Transbaikal Front received the 39th Army (from the Koenigsberg region), the 53rd Army, and the 6th Guards Tank Army (from near Prague). The 5th Army came from Eastern Prussia to join the 1st Far Eastern Front. In addition a large number of tank, artillery, aviation, engineer, and other units and formations were sent to the Far East.

Headquarters did not choose these armies by accident. The personnel of the 5th and 39th armies had considerable experience breaking through fortified defensive zones similar to the fortified regions of the Japanese troops on the Manchurian border. This later was the determining factor in choosing the place and missions of these armies in the operational structure of the fronts. Specifically, the 5th Army, set in the primary axis of the 1st Far Eastern Front, was designated to break through fortified regions toward Mudanzhang and the 39th Army, as part of the Transbaikal Front, was designated to break through the Halung-Arshang fortified region and combining in part with the 36th Army, take the Hailar fortified region.

As for the 53rd Army and 6th Guards Tank Army, they were sent to the Transbaikal front because they had significant experience with combat actions in mountains and were able to maneuver swiftly and carry out assigned missions with initiative and determination.

This regrouping of such significant forces (men and equipment) in a relatively short time over a distance of 9,000-11,000 kilometers was one of the largest such movements in history. It involved great difficulties because all the troops, combat equipment, and supplies had to be shipped along the only available route, the Transsiberian Railroad. The Transbaikal Front, which received about half of all the forces moved to the Far East, had particularly great difficulties.

The arriving units and formations were supposed to unload in Choybalsan, but the traffic capacity of the rail sectors from Karymskaya Station to Borzya Station and from Borzya Station to Choybalsan Station, the sectors where the front was based, could not support such train traffic.

To ease the congestion in this rail sector and speed up the concentration and deployment of troops on the border, the front command decided to unload motorized units and subunits and artillery with mechanical traction in the Chita — Karymskaya sector, 500-600 kilometers from the assembly areas, and have them drive in themselves over unpaved roads. To accomplish this the front headquarters sent special groups of officers to Irkutsk and Karymskaya Station. These officers determined in advance which units would be sent to Choybalsan by railroad and which would have to unload between Chita and Karymskaya Station and proceed under their own power.

The units that disembarked early had to travel across the waterless steppes of the Transbaikal and Mongolia in intense heat, facing thick dust. Nonetheless, the rifle troops made up to 40 kilometers a day and motorized forces traveled more than 100 kilometers a day. An assembly area was allocated for each formation in the Choybalsan region. In these areas the units that had come by rail were reunited with units and subunits that traveled under their own power. After this the full-strength divisions moved to their concentration areas, another 300-400 kilometers.

Although moving a significant number of troops a large distance in their own vehicles involved additional fuel consumption, we were able to concentrate and deploy all the forces of the front on time, which was extremely important. The experience of concentrating the forces of the Transbaikal Front shows that motorized units and formations are capable of moving large distances at high speed under their own power.

In addition to conveying a large number of units and formations from the West significant regroupings were carried out between and within the fronts. They were done by rail over distances of up to 1,500 kilometers (from Blagoveshchensk to Primor'ye) and combined (partly on

foot and partly by vehicle) marches of 250-500 kilometers. These movements involved an additional 30 rifle, tank, and cavalry divisions (including the cavalry of the Mongolian Army). In all, up to 1 million Soviet fighting men were moving to the deployment regions in trains, vehicles, and on the march along the communication routes of Siberia, the Transbaikal, and the Far East.

Early in August the formations of the armies and fronts moved to starting positions for the attack on a front from Erlyan' to Pos'yet. By 8 August the headquarters of the Transbaikal Front was already in the Tamtsak-Bulak region of Mongolia, the headquarters of the 1st Far Eastern Front had moved from Ussuriysk to the Grodekovo region, and the headquarters of the 2nd Far Eastern Front had transferred from Khabarovsk to the Leninskoye region.

By the start of the war with Japan 11 combined arms armies and one tank army were concentrated in the Far East. In all this group (with rear units and institutions of the fronts) had about 1.5 million men, more than 26,000 guns and mortars, more than 5,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery guns, and about 3,900 fighting aircraft. These figures show that while Soviet forces had a small superiority in number of personnel, they were significantly superior to the enemy in combat equipment. This was one of the important prerequisites for rapidly breaking through the Japanese border fortifications and developing the offensive swiftly deep into Manchuria.

Now let us consider in general outline the course of combat actions during the campaign in the Far East (see map).

The forces of the Transbaikal Front, commanded by Mar SU R. Ya. Malinovskiy went on the offensive during the night of 9 August. By 18-19 August they had crossed the waterless desert and Greater Hingan range, smashed the Kalgan, Solun, and Hailar groupings of Japanese forces and in the vast region from Qiqihar to Kalgan were racing forward in six columns on to the Manchurian plain, toward the enemy's key industrial and administrative centers. On 20 August the main forces of the 6th Guards Tank Army entered Changchun and Mukden, after which they began advancing south toward Darien (Lüta), Port Arthur (Lüshun), and Andong.

The mechanized cavalry group of Soviet-Mongolian forces of the fronts, commanded by Col Gen I. A. Pliyev reached the Kalgan-Rehe front on 18 August, thereby cutting off the Kwantoon Army from the strong grouping of Japanese forces operating in China. Units of the 8th People's Revolutionary Army of China were operating to the south of the Pliyev group.

The forces of the 1st Far Eastern Front, commanded by Mar SU K. A. Meretskov, at the same time broke through the zone of fortified border regions, repulsed strong Japanese counterattacks in the Mudanzhang

region, and entered Kirin (Jilin) on 20 August. In cooperation with the 2nd Far Eastern Front commanded by Army Gen M. A. Purkayev, they took Kharbin. Units of the 25th Army, cooperating with landing forces of the Pacific Ocean Fleet, took the principal ports of North Korea, Yuki, Rasin, Seisin, and Wonsan, thereby cutting the right-flank grouping of the Kwantoon Army off from Central and South Korea and blocking its paths of retreat to the south.

On 9-10 August the forces of the 2nd Far Eastern Front, in close cooperation with the Red Banner Amur River Flotilla, successfully crossed the Amur and Ussuri rivers in several sectors and developed the offensive into Manchuria.

There were distinctive features, especially early in the campaign, in the actions of each front. They were the result of the terrain in the attack zone of each front, the system and nature of the enemy defense, and the deployment of enemy groupings. For example, the 1st Far Eastern Front had to begin its offensive by breaking through a long-term defense relying on a strong zone of fortified border regions. Only after doing this could it develop its tactical success into an operational one. The 2nd Far Eastern Front was able to develop its success deep into Manchuria after simply crossing the Amur and Ussuri rivers, although after heavy recent rains they were up to 2-2.5 kilometers wide.

The Transbaikal Front faced completely different conditions for its offensive operation. The formations operating in its left flank had to overcome fortified regions and centers of resistance, while the troops of the main group and right flank were to knock out the border posts and move as quickly as possible across the waterless steppes and Greater Hingan mountains. Seizing the passes through the Greater Hingan before the enemy prevented the Japanese from forcing us into protracted fighting in unfavorable terrain and made it possible to reach the central regions of Manchuria quickly.

The headquarters of the fronts planned their operations with these distinctive features in mind. They formed groupings, organized battle formations, received reinforcements, and outlined methods of action. These operations deserve careful attention. A study of them, keeping in mind existing means of combat, will help reach several useful theoretical conclusions for waging operations in the initial period of a war under contemporary conditions as well.

Carrying out their assigned missions, the Soviet troops by the opening of the 10th day of the offensive had inflicted a major defeat on the enemy, overcome powerful long-term fortifications and difficult desert, mountain-forest, and swamp terrain, and advanced deep into Manchuria, 500-800 kilometers from the west, 200-300 kilometers from the east, and up to 200 kilometers from the north. The Japanese command, convinced that further resistance by its troops would be pointless,

announced that it was ready to lay down its arms and surrender to the Soviet Armed Forces. Thus, organized military operations by the Kwantoon Army lasted just 10 days.

The day of the turning point in the Far Eastern campaign was 19 August. In almost every location the formations and units of the Kwantoon Army began surrendering. On this day Soviet airborne landing parties were landed in Mukden, Kirin, Harbin, and other cities of Central Manchuria with the objective of hastening the disarmament and imprisonment of the Kwantoon Army.

Developing the success of the Manchurian operations, the 25th Army of the 1st Far Eastern Front in cooperation with ships of the Pacific Ocean Fleet liberated North Korea.

In the period between 11 August and 1 September part of the forces of the 2nd Far Eastern Front cooperating with the fleet carried out successful operations to liberate South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands.

With the defeat of the Kwantoon Army and the loss of its military-economic base on the Asian continent Japan was deprived of the forces and opportunities actually needed not just to continue the war in Manchuria but also to offer organized resistance in other regions.

Because the decisive events on whose success the outcome of the campaign depended took place in Manchuria, we will now devote our primary attention to issues related primarily to the organization and conduct of the Manchurian strategic offensive.

The strategic operation to smash the Kwantoon Army is interesting in both conception and methods of performance of the missions given by Headquarters. Its instructive features include the enormous spatial scope, actions by formations and operational groupings in distinct, disconnected sectors, the great depth of front and army operations, and the high rate of advance by Soviet troops.

The conception and planning of the Manchurian strategic operation was decisively influenced not only by the important military-political objective but also the favorable (for us) configuration of the Soviet-Manchurian border. Soviet forces encircled the enemy at the start of the offensive, and this made it possible to direct strikes against the flanks of the Kwantoon Army, carry out a deep envelopment of its main forces quickly, and break them up and destroy them by parts. Armored forces, the 6th Guards Tank Army which was part of the assault group of the Transbaikal Front and the 10th Mechanized Corps which was included in the assault group of the 1st Far Eastern Front, were given a large part in accomplishing these missions.

It should be observed that during the campaign in the Far East the 6th Guards Tank Army had a unique composition which was appropriate to its use for decisive, independent, and highly mobile actions when significantly removed from the main forces of the combined arms formations. In addition to one tank corps and two mechanized corps the army had two motorized rifle divisions. Thus this army, consisting of 80 percent mechanized formations, was in actuality a mechanized army with great mobility, bearing the name 6th Tank Army.

Several powerful, simultaneous front and army strikes united by a single strategic conception made it possible to defeat the enemy in a comparatively short time. As events showed, under these conditions the command of the Kwantoon Army could not organize effective responses; it had neither the time nor the opportunities to do so.

The decisive character of the Soviet Union's objectives, the vast size of the theater of military operations, the special features of the enemy grouping, and our superiority in forces also caused the enormous scope of the operations. The military operations that unfolded in Manchuria engulfed an area of roughly 1.5 million square kilometers. The depth of the offensive reached 300-820 kilometers in different sectors with rates of advance of 30-80 and more kilometers a day.

The conduct of such a large strategic offensive with the forces of three fronts in an extraordinarily complex (from the standpoint of natural conditions) theater of military operations, to great depth and at a high pace, is an edifying example in the history of the Soviet Armed Forces.

I would like to emphasize that whereas on the Soviet-German front the objectives of major strategic offensives conducted to a depth of 400-600 kilometers were usually achieved by conducting several successive operations by front groupings, in Manchuria the fronts conducted one operation apiece, to the full depth of a strategic operation.

The possibility of assigning such deep objectives to the fronts is explained by the considerable force of the initial strike, the relatively small enemy cover forces in the border region, the availability of motor-mechanized and tank formations within the assault groups of the Transbaikal and 1st Far Eastern fronts, the supremacy of our aviation in the air, and the absence of prepared defensive zones in the operational depths of the enemy defense.

Successful conduct of the Manchurian strategic operation depended largely on choosing the axes of the main strikes. These axes were determined by the conception of the operation, configuration of the border, nature of the grouping of Japanese forces, and their system of defense. There were, of course, two such strikes: one from the Tamtsak-Bulak bulge in Mongolia in the general direction of Changchun

and Mukden by the main forces of the Transbaikal Front, and the other from the region south of Lake Hanka against Kirin with the forces of the 1st Far Eastern Front. The attack of the Transbaikal Front was aimed at the boundary between the Kalgan-Suiyan and Solun groupings of Japanese forces, bypassing the Hailar and Halung-Arshang fortified regions on the south. This attack cut the 3rd Japanese Front into parts. Before reaching the central regions of Manchuria our troops attacking on this axis had to cross the waterless desert steppe and then the rugged Greater Hingan range. But their experience with combat operations under mountain conditions gave reason to expect that they would be able to handle these difficulties.

The Transbaikal Front also prepared two subsidiary strikes: in the general direction of Jinzhou on the right flank to secure the forces of the main front grouping against possible enemy counterstrikes from the south and isolate the Kalgan-Suiyan grouping of Japanese forces from the main forces of the Kwantoon Army, and against Hailar and Qiqihar on the left flank with the objective of smashing the 4th Detached Japanese Army and giving the forces of the main grouping reliable cover on the north. If this were successful it appeared possible to continue the attack to Harbin and reach the rear of the Japanese forces opposing the 2nd Far Eastern Front, which had to cross the Amur and Ussuri rivers.

The attack of the 1st Far Eastern Front led along the shortest axis to the Kirin region to join up with forces of the assault group of the Transbaikal Front. It is true that our forces had to break through a zone of Japanese fortified regions in this axis. But the availability of adequate means of suppression and experience in breaking through fortified zones made the mission entirely feasible. This front also carried out two subsidiary strikes, against Harbin on the right flank, and on the left flank in the direction of Yanji and further along the eastern coast of North Korea.

In general, the direction of the two main strikes enabled Soviet forces to quickly deprive the Kwantoon Army of communications with the motherland and the nearest large group of Japanese forces in Northern China and also promoted rapid encirclement of the main forces of the Kwantoon Army.

By attacking in the Blagoveshchensk-Qiqihar and Leninskoye-Harbin axes, the 2nd Far Eastern Front was to pin down enemy forces in the Amur region.

The natural conditions of the theater of military operations exerted a significant influence on the deployment of Soviet forces in starting positions and the nature of their offensive operations. The waterless steppes, high deserts, and mountain taiga regions permitted operational groupings and even formations to operate in certain operational axes where there were routes of communication, but they were

often hundreds of kilometers from one another. This made cooperation and control of troops more difficult, limited maneuvering with formations, and created great difficulties in the work of rear services. Only upon reaching the plains of Central Manchuria did favorable conditions arise for close, direct cooperation between the advancing groups of the front.

Despite the significant dispersal of the attacking groups, the command and headquarters were able to achieve precise coordination of actions during the operation. The offensive along distinct axes is characteristic of contemporary military operations. A study of this question based on the experience of the Manchurian operation can provide useful material for contemporary military theory and troop combat training.

Shallow operational construction of the fronts was typical of the Manchurian offensive operation. Whereas fronts in strategic offensive operations conducted by the Soviet Army in the European theater generally had second echelons with 1-2 combined arms armies and 1-2 tank armies, in this operation almost all forces (with the exception of one army of the Transbaikal Front) were concentrated in the first echelon. This was necessitated by the desire to crush the Japanese defense in the border zone with a strong initial assault and immediately attain a high rate of advance. The 53rd Army, which the Transbaikal Front had in its second echelon, was used to fill the broad gap between the 39th and 17th armies after the 6th Guards Tank Army moved quickly ahead.

The 1st Far Eastern Front had two rifle corps and one mechanized corps in reserve. The mechanized corps was designated to develop the offensive at a high pace after the infantry, with close support tanks and artillery and aviation, had overcome the border zone of long-term fortifications in the East Manchurian mountains. Therefore, the mechanized corps was to be fed into the breakthrough at a depth of about 100 kilometers from the forward edge of defense.

Let us briefly review how the 6th Guards Tank Army was used in the operation. In earlier offensive operations involving a break through a prepared defense, of course, to avoid large losses tank armies were usually committed to action after the tactical zone of defense had been broken through by forces of the combined arms armies, or just before this happened. Things were different in the Transbaikal Front. The enemy defense south of Halung-Arshang was not strong, so it was decided to use the 6th Guards Tank Army in the first echelon of the operational structure of the front in the axis of the main strike. Within the tank army the mechanized corps were to advance in the first echelon. Despite the considerable difficulties involved in crossing the waterless sandy desert and mountains of the Greater Hingan, this application of the tank army was entirely justified and purposeful. It made it possible to wipe out the comparatively weak enemy forces in the border zone quickly, beat the main forces of the

Kwantoon Army to the passes over the Greater Hingan, and break through to the central regions of Manchuria in a swift assault.

The 6th Guards Tank Army was supposed to develop the offensive far ahead of neighboring combined arms armies along two routes that were 75 kilometers from one another. To enable the corps of the first echelon of the tank army to perform their varied missions during the offensive, one motorized rifle division was attached to each. These divisions, which had been stationed in the Far East for a long time, were well trained for actions in desert and mountain country. They advanced at the head of the columns of the mechanized corps, which helped accomplish the missions given to the 6th Guards Tank Army.

The experience of the 6th Guards Tank Army and of other armies advancing in independent sectors demonstrated the extraordinary importance of reconnaissance, securing the flanks, and communication with neighbors under such conditions. Studying this experience can be very useful for current combat training for troops and staffs.

The high rate of its advance was an important feature of the actions of the 6th Guards Tank Army. Despite the exceptionally difficult terrain, its average rate of advance, as already mentioned above, was 82 kilometers a day. It was much more at other times. This pace was accomplished not only because the enemy did not offer strong resistance, but also because logistic support, especially supplying fuel and water, had been carefully planned. Water supply during an operation was a completely new logistical question for armored and mechanized troops. The steps that we took, for example strictly rationing the use of water supplies and sending special teams ahead to scout for and set up sources of water at major troop halting points, made it possible to solve this problem, which was beneficial to the entire operation by the Transbaikal Front. Another new feature was our first use of air transport divisions to supply the rapidly advancing tank army, which was operating far ahead of the remaining forces of the front and rear services.

The high pace of advance achieved by Soviet troops in the Manchurian operation helped break the forces of the Kwantoon Army into separate, isolated groups quickly, deprived the enemy of the time needed to put his forces in order, prevented him from maneuvering with reserves, and disrupted enemy control and rear operations. All these things greatly reduced the fighting effectiveness of the Japanese forces and brought their surrender nearer.

Given the high pace of advance with troops moving in columns, forward detachments were used extensively. Many of them were formed in the armies of all three fronts before the start of the operation. These detachments, formed chiefly of tank brigades reinforced with motorized infantry and vehicle-mounted artillery, cleared away enemy roadblocks, enabling the main forces to continue movement, often

without deploying. Only in cases where the forces of the forward detachment were inadequate to overcome enemy resistance were some of the division forces sent to their aid. Forward detachments played an especially large part in the concluding stage of the operation when our formations reached Central Manchuria and had to seize important enemy centers on the run. The forward detachments worked very well under conditions of rapid advance and development of events. The experience with their use should be studied and introduced in practice.

Airborne landing parties played a useful role, especially in the final stage of the operation. Between 18 and 27 August airborne parties landed in the central cities of Manchuria, on the Liadong Peninsula, in North Korea, and on South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands and, before the arrival of land troops, took over the most important military and industrial installations, preventing their destruction. They helped disarm the troops of the Kwantoon Army who surrendered.

I would like to at least discuss briefly the role of surprise in the Manchurian operation. Of course, it would hardly have been possible to completely conceal the movement of such numbers of men and equipment from Japanese reconnaissance. The Japanese command certainly did know that our offensive was in preparation. But the enemy was unable to establish exactly when it would begin, with what forces, and in what sectors. This was owing to safeguards and concealment steps taken by the Soviet command.

All troop movements related to their deployment were done during the hours of darkness. The concentration areas were set at a significant distance from the state border. The troops were carefully camouflaged there. Until the morning of 9 August the radios of the new formations were used only for receiving. A peacetime schedule was followed on the state border and among troops stationed in the Far East. Generals and officers going on officers' reconnaissance wore the uniforms of enlisted men.

As we learned later, the Japanese command was able to establish a gradual increase in Soviet forces on the border with Manchuria and identify the mass movement of formations from the West beginning in June. But it was not able to determine when our offensive would begin or the direction and strength of the assaults.

According to the testimony of the Japanese generals, the beginning of military operations by the Soviet Army on 9 August was a complete surprise. The Japanese command was convinced that we had only 35-45 divisions in the Far East at that time, an inadequate number for a decisive attack. According to their thinking, we needed an additional 10-15 divisions. Based on this, the Japanese command concluded that military operations could not begin for another month or two, that is, in the fall when the weather in Manchuria would be best; but they also

believed that it could not begin later because the Soviet forces, according to their information, had not shipped any materiel for winter operations to the Far East.

The Kwantoon Army began regrouping its forces at a time when Soviet troops had already begun to occupy their starting positions for the attack. This was the best time to attack. The enemy was caught off guard. The headquarters and formations of the Kwantoon Army were en route on 9 August and had not reached their appointed places. They lost communication with higher headquarters, troop command and control was disrupted, and the regrouping did not have the desired result.

The campaign in the Far East had a great diversity of methods of action by all the branches of the armed forces that took part in it. Thus, as mentioned above, in some sectors of the front ground forces broke through long-term fortifications and, having repulsed counterattacks, developed their success. In other sectors they crossed rivers, while in still other sectors after breaking through the defense in particular sectors the attacking armies moved swiftly ahead, depriving the enemy of an opportunity to occupy good defensive ground. The Pacific Ocean Fleet landed parties on the east coast of North Korea, the Liadong Peninsula, South Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands, which helped ground forces to capture these regions. In addition, the fleet waged battle on the enemy's sea lanes in the Sea of Japan.

The air force provided support to ground forces breaking through the defense and during the advance. They also carried out strikes against enemy lines of communication on land and at sea and against regions where Japanese forces were concentrated, major headquarters, and communications centers. This significantly disrupted enemy control and supply. A new mission for aviation was indicating the direction of movement to forces of the Transbaikal Front as they crossed the desert and mountain terrain. Military transport aviation, as already mentioned, was first used to supply fast-advancing ground formations. All these things illustrate the great complexity of the missions that the command and troops had to accomplish during the campaign.

The victory won by the Soviet Armed Forces in Manchuria was a major contribution to eliminating the focus of World War II in the Far East. The defeat and surrender of the Kwantoon Army was the greatest defeat that Japan suffered in World War II and finally undermined its ability to continue the war. Thus, our lightning campaign in the Far East greatly hastened the end of the war, which threatened to drag on much longer. This should be emphasized because there are many "investigators" in the Western countries who, in spite of the truth, try to play down or to completely deny the major role played by the Soviet Union in bringing World War II to an end.

Some of them say that Japan could not have continued the war because of Anglo-American successes at sea, while others see the reason for its defeat in the atomic bombs dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Still others say that Japan's war production had been curtailed because of military operations, the naval blockade, and aerial bombing. However, it is common knowledge that before the Soviet Union entered the war the Japanese government firmly rejected the demands for unconditional surrender delivered by the United States, England, and China.

Even before the Crimean conference the Allies, in particular the United States, wanted the USSR to join the war against Japan as soon as possible. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff defined the principles behind U. S. policy with respect to the entry of the Soviet Union into the war in the Far East as follows: "The earliest possible entry by Russia commensurate with its ability to participate in offensive operations is essential to insure maximum support for our Pacific Ocean operations."[2] This issue was raised by the Americans again at the Crimean conference.

The leaders of the United States and England admitted then that if the USSR did not join the war against Japan, they would have to concentrate an army of up to 7 million in Asia for decisive operations on the islands of Japan and this, according to their calculations, would have taken roughly 18 months after the end of the war in Europe. For this reason the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a report to Roosevelt and Churchill at the Crimean conference on 9 February 1945. The report said: ""We recommend setting the approximate date for the end of the war with Japan at 18 months after the defeat of Germany."[3]

The Soviet Union, guided by an endeavor to shorten the war which had taken millions of human lives, assumed the obligation of entering the war against Japan three months after the defeat of Germany. This was the minimum time necessary to prepare for an operation and move additional men and equipment to the Far East.

The undermining of Japanese military power at sea and in the air did not shake the intention of the Japanese military to continue the war. They believed that when the battle began for the islands of Japan, the forces of the ground army on the continent, left untouched, would enable Japan to hold out for a long time. But as Japanese investigators of the war in the Pacific point out, this line of argument lost all its force when the Soviet Union entered the war. "Supreme Headquarters immediately issued an order to begin military operations against the Soviet Union, but these were late, compulsive efforts dictated by

---

[2] "The Conferences at Malta and Yalta," Washington, 1955, p 396.

[3] Feis, H., "Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin," London, 1957, p 503.

desperation. The instructions given to the Kwantoon Army and the order to the expeditionary army in China to move troops in to help the Kwantoon Army remained nothing but paper. Supreme Headquarters had completely lost control of operations on the Soviet-Japanese front, and there was nothing it could do but fold its hands and watch the Kwantoon Army be crushed. The Japanese surrender to the United States and England was predetermined when the Soviet Union entered the war."[4]

The victory won by our Armed Forces in the Far East greatly hastened the end of World War II and spared our peoples great sacrifices. It was vivid testimony to the strength of the Soviet social and state order and a new triumph of the Soviet art of warfare. This victory was achieved through the heroic deeds of the Soviet people led by the Communist Party.

The great fighting spirit and courage of our soldiers and the great organizational talents of our generals and officers, armed with a progressive military theory, showed with new force during the campaign in the Far East.

11,176
CSO:8144/1623

[4]"Istoriya..." op. cit., p 210

OFFICERS' TECHNICAL TRAINING: VIEWS OF TANK SCHOOL COMMANDANT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Tank Trps MajGen V. Kurchavov, commandant, Ul'yanovsk V. I. Lenin Higher Guards Tank Command School: "Let's Discuss the Letter 'Getting the Most from the Equipment': Knowing It and Being Able to Do It"]

[Text] Is it possible to exaggerate the importance of the officer's individual technical training, his ability to shoot, drive the vehicle or carry out the duties of the specialists among his soldiers? This is an approximate formulation of one of the questions raised in Maj V. Shipitsin's letter. The question is a serious one. The answer to it will determine the nature and content of officer training, the allocation of the officer's efforts and the distribution of the extremely limited amount of time which he is able to devote to his individual training.

My experience serving among the troops and at the military school has convinced me: an in-depth knowledge of equipment and weapons is as necessary to the officer as the air he breathes. Equipment and tactics are inseparable. To assume that the officer can skillfully organize combat operations by simply relying on his knowledge of vehicle and weapons systems performance characteristics is to lose touch with reality, to be mistaken. Effective use is made of weapons by the commander who has grown up with equipment, who has mastered firm skills for employing it in all types of combat, under various terrain conditions, in any climate and in any weather.

With the increased diversity in equipment and weapons, the acute shortage of time and the large number of missions which are just as important, will the officer be able to become a marksman or an expert driver? The answer is provided by experience: yes, he will be able to.

Experience shows that maintaining his "form" of being continually ready to carry out firing missions or to drive a vehicle over difficult roads requires 3-4 training sessions per month. Moreover, it is not mandatory that it be live fire or driving the vehicle over the terrain. The forces and the military educational institutions have enough good, modern simulators. It can only be regretted that their capabilities are underrated at some places and reliance is placed on firing rifle rounds or driving and wasting vehicle resources.

There are also errors in the methods of learning to handle new equipment. Frequently, the training officers--and the same thing happens at the military schools--do not find the optimal ratio between theory and practice; they forget that the main thing is practical ability. Naturally, the importance of theory cannot be downplayed. In-depth, comprehensive academic training makes it possible for the officer to master, including on his own, any kind of new equipment within stringent deadlines. But, even in this case, theory is only a handmaiden to practice. It cannot be asserted that an officer knows the capabilities of a particular combat vehicle after checking it out in a table of performance characteristics. He must be tested in the field, using this data to organize for combat and to command his unit.

Isn't it really the case that even during a test the officer talks about the vehicle's operating principles with a pointer in his hands? Why don't we require him to perform the standard which regulates its operation or to adjust a particular device? The list toward theory is, unfortunately, not rare.

While conducting training sessions, other OIC's focus their primary attention on the EM and NCO's and sort of put the junior officer on the back burner. The officer himself is not really sure of his personal skills; he is frankly shy in front of his subordinates, is afraid of damaging his authority in front of them and does not use all his opportunities to practice on the equipment. So, it turns out that he loses what he left the school with.

There is a great deal of psychological import in the first lessons where the training level of yesterday's school graduate is tested. The lieutenant is just beginning his service in the unit. A new environment, an unusual range and tank training area, a certain training loss after his leave.... So, the result is poor firing performance or mistakes on the driving course. In these situations, it is important that the regimental or battalion commander display his worldly widsom and not exaggerate his subordinate's failures or draw far-flung conclusions

from them. Frequently, during a follow-up run, the young platoon leader will accomplish the mission with a great deal more confidence. In short, it is necessary to create a principled atmosphere where the officer's faith in his own capabilities will grow day by day and where he will burn with a desire to correct his shortcomings as quickly as possible and boldly sit behind the wheel or the sight, aware that, in any case, he can anticipate not reproaches or ironic glances but assistance and support.

Many units have developed a good practice of conducting refresher training for the school graduates. The calm, business-like environment during the lessons, the friendly attitude toward each participant in the training and a careful analysis of the reasons for his deficiencies set the proper tone for all the subsequent work with the lieutenants.

As is well known, the schools' curricula allocate too little time for systematic training. But, there is some slack here. At our school, the plan is drawn up to give each cadet hands-on weapons training 3-4 times a month and drivers training 2-3 times a month. To do this, we use scheduled lessons and independent study time. Cadets making poor progress during independent study get firing and fire control training at the artillery training area and they improve their tank driving skills at the movie simulator. At lessons on tactical training and on driving, the cadets carry out the duties of crew members.

In the senior classes, cadets are assigned to tank commander and gunner positions. Beginning this year, we anticipate assigning them to driver positions also. The objective is to help future officers gain a deeper understanding of the duties of the specialists they will have to train, educate and prepare for combat. Of great satisfaction to us is the fact that our graduates--as evidence, we have films and recordings, test results and testimonials from units--have begun to fire and drive their combat vehicles with more confidence and they are technically better trained.

Our special concern is to arm our graduates with the skills of organizing for combat and of commanding a small unit in a difficult environment. Beginning with the freshman year, emphasis is placed on practical skills. We teach the future officers to organize for combat on the ground, assign missions, ensure coordination and execute maneuvers. The tests in all the courses include the accomplishment of practical missions. The lessons in the field are combined with training sessions in the classroom on tactical control. The school's officers also study in this well-equipped auditorium.

We closely combine an improvement in the cadets' technical training with goal-directed political indoctrination to promote the famous traditions of the Guards school and the feats of the Ul'yanovsk tankers who displayed unfading courage during the war and the ability to make expert use of their remarkable equipment.

Every school has some slack for improving its performance in training and education. This slack must be discovered and used. There is also a lot of slack for accelerating the command development of junior officers among the troops. It is no secret that, in some units, yesterday's cadets quickly acquire the maturity of command while, in other units, their development drags on for a long time. The interests of combat readiness demand an efficient synthesis of advanced techniques and continuity between the schools' curricula and the officer training programs within the forces. Even during his junior years, each officer can and should become an expert in organizing for combat, an experienced tatician and an expert on equipment and weapons systems.

9001
CSO: 1801

MILITARY DISCIPLINE: UNAUTHORIZED ACTIONS CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by LtCol A. Drovosekov: "Returning to the Printed Word: They Brushed It Off Again"]

[Text] Six months before his transfer to the reserve, Pvt S. Vylkost had his driver's license and demerit book taken away--they were taken from the soldier by LtCol I. Durakov for a misdemeanor which had nothing to do with any traffic violations. The documents were not returned to the soldier when he transferred to the reserves. The nine letters that he sent to the unit went unanswered. Then, Vylkost turned to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA for help. On 16 January, the newspaper published a comment, "They Brushed It Off," which expressed the hope that the individual who had been indifferent and callous and who had violated the socialist rule of law would be held strictly accountable. After all, nobody gave LtCol Durakov the authority to take the soldier's license to his vocation away from him.

After the newspaper article, there was every reason to expect that Unit X in Leningrad Military District--where Comrade Durakov was reassigned several months before the comment was published--would definitely take him to task. However, January and February passed and there was no news of the action taken. It was already the last two weeks of March before a letter arrived from the unit. But, it was not an official letter but a personal one. It stated that Comrade Durakov was not paying any attention to the criticism in the press. As before, he is taking licenses away from drivers as punishment.

I must admit that I didn't believe it. Could it be that a man who has been singled out for his illegal actions was not able to draw the proper conclusions. But, a fact is a fact: on the day of my arrival in the unit, LtCol I. Durakov was keeping Pvt N. Shamara's driver's license in his safe. Moreover, it had been there since last December.

"Ivan Ivanovich" I asked Comrade Durakov with peaked interest, "why did you take the soldier's license?"

"I didn't take the license personally. It was given to me by the unit commander. I have it because I intend to initiate a request that Pvt Shamara's right to drive a motor vehicle be taken away from him for his lack of discipline."

The unit political officer, SrLt. S. Bondarenko does not share this opinion. He officially stated that the soldier's lack of discipline occurred in the past. Since he has been dismissed from driving a motor vehicle and put in a formation, there have been no serious complaints about him. He has a conscientious attitude toward the service.

Thus, Comrade Durakov was wrong again. First, he should have returned the driver's license to the soldier because the power to take this document away temporarily is vested in the post's Military Motor Vehicle Inspection officer, his deputy and their inspectors and, then, in strictly defined cases. Second, if Comrade Durakov had decided to request that the soldier's driver's license be taken away as punishment for his misdemeanor, he should have carried out this intention within 30 days as stipulated in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's 19 June 1968 Ukaz. Talking about one's intention to punish a soldier over three months after he has been dismissed from driving a motor vehicle is, at the least, not being serious. Moreover, the intention itself is extremely debatable from the legal point of view since the soldier's misdemeanor was not related to a traffic violation or to motor vehicle operation.

It should be pointed out that Comrade Durakov is a hard-working officer who is concerned about the job entrusted to him. He is uncompromising with sloppiness and disciplinary infractions. But, while his actions can be understood to a certain extent, they cannot be justified. There is the impression that of all the disciplinary actions, he prefers one which is not provided for by any regulations or orders--taking away driver's licenses. And not just taking them away. He may also take a service record.

Pvt V. Zelenyak was dismissed from driving a motor vehicle for his lack of discipline. Aware that LtCol I. Durakov might take away his driver's license in anger, the soldier sent it home. And, he was not mistaken--Ivan Ivanovich requested his license a short time later. But, since he no longer had it, he took the soldier's service record and intended to make a note in it about his dismissal from driving motor vehicles for his entire service career and, then, ...he went on leave.

So, it turns out that officer Durakov's one violation of the law--taking away the military record--was done with the intent to commit a second violation: making an unauthorized notation.

It is possible that Comrade Durakov's senior officers did not know about this case. But, it would definitely have been well known if they had not brushed off the newspaper article but had reacted to it in a true party manner. However, the imperative, requisite actions were not taken and the requisite evaluation was not made.

This is why we had to return to the printed word and repeat the well-known truth. After all, we cannot permit even individual cases where arbitrariness is the norm.

9001
CSO: 1801

MILITARY DISCIPLINE: COURT MARTIAL DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by LtCol V. Filatov, special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Transbaykal Military District: "The Verdict"]

[Excerpts] Pvt V. Radzhabov, a civil engineer, is being tried. There is a long, red cloth-covered table; behind the table is the court martial judge; he is the one presiding in this case--Leg Svc LtCol F. Lisunov.

Capt S. Lunde, the commander of the company where Radzhabov served prior to his offense, was located in the very last row, near the wall. The captain is here as a witness. Radzhabov is sitting down front, facing the judge.

The judge is asking Radzhabov questions and the latter responds, standing. The defendant has not refused to speak; he is telling everything like it was--yes, he was absent without leave in town; yes, he got drunk at a girlfriend's house; while returning, he wandered into the coal bin, stumbled into the hopper, got into it, saw a soldier there and beat him up without any reason. Then, a second soldier appeared and he beat him up too. The soldiers were new recruits and Radzhabov had never set eyes on them before. They both took a serious beating.

Radzhabov answered all the judge's questions; there was only one he was not able to provide an intelligible answer to--this was when the judge asked why he beat up two totally unknown people. "I was drunk..."--that is all he was able to say.

The judge asked Radzhabov: "How were you able to leave the company? After all, the company has a charge-of-quarters and a duty officer who are charged to keep order and to ensure that all personnel follow the daily routine."

"A-a, it's not worth mentioning in our unit," was the response.

The judge called Lunde's name. The witness approached from the last row and stopped three paces from the judge's table. Lunde was now the same distance from the judge's table as Radzhabov; only, Radzhabov was sitting down and Lunde was standing.

For a little under a year, they had been serving in the same company--the private and the captain. They both got off to a good start: Lunde had not had to punish a single person and Radzhabov was assigned as a squad leader and had submitted a request to be accepted in the Komsomol.... It's true, that Radzhabov was, as the saying goes, no gift to the company from the very beginning.

Changing his tone to the one he used to examine Radzhabov, the judge began to ask Lunde, the company commander, questions:

"Radzhabov has been convicted before. Did you take this fact into account in your individual work with him?"

"Not especially. I treated him like the rest. What sort of special treatment could there have been?"

"Your former subordinate used to go to town on pass. Tell me, where did he go and how did he spend his time?"

"How should I know?" the captain asked in true surprise. "He was going somewhere. The most important thing was that he came back on time."

"Do you think Radzhabov liked his job?"

"Evidently, he did. This has stimulated an interest in him now; but, he was like everybody else. After all, we had a plan to fulfill."

"Radzhabov served time in the guard house on three occasions."

"Yes, I punished him."

"Please answer whether you counseled Radzhabov when he was sent to the guard house and when he returned to the unit?"

"I can't say for sure now; but, I probably said something to him."

"Does Radzhabov have any friends in the company that he always associates with, friends that he spends his time with?"

"He probably does; like everybody, he can't spend all his time alone."

What kind of books does Radzhabov read? What kind of hobbies did he have?"

"I can't say for sure."

"How do you explain this fact: Radzhabov went AWOL unhindered and the people on duty did not react to it? He was AWOL for several hours and nobody in the unit discovered his absence."

"I would have to look into it...."

"Have there been other cases where soldiers from your company have stood trial?"

"Yes, last year."

"What is being done in the company to prevent similar occurrences in the future?"

The captain is silent.

"Well, what is the reason for this state of affairs in the company?..."

The captain has nothing to say.

Radzhabov was convicted. He had committed a grave crime--he had raised his hand against another soldier. And, he, Radzhabov, would be held responsible for this. There was no justification for the crime. I saw the uncompromising looks given Radzhabov by the spectators in the courtroom. Radzhabov was afraid to look at them; he shrank from their looks and this provided even more reinforcement for the inevitable sentence and for the angry annoyance with what this man had done.

In the prosecutor's summation on the causes contributing to commission of the crime, he said: "...Radzhabov was AWOL and drunk; however, his commander, Capt S. Lunde, did not take any action to establish Radzhabov's whereabouts...," all of this, along with "Radzhabov's own personal lack of discipline contributed to the commission of the crime." He ended his summation with the words: "I request...a judgement on the issue of nonjudicial proceedings against Capt Lunde...."

Radzhabov was sentenced to four years deprivation of freedom to be served in a maximum security corrective labor colony.

About 3-4 days after the trial, I met Lunde. We talked for a long time. I asked him whether he himself had ever been punished? He stuttered and said he had, but, then what commander hadn't? I asked him what he was punished for? Again, there was an evasive answer: he said they were all because of them, his subordinates.

There was an aggrieved tone in Lunde's voice, as if someone was being unjust toward him. Meanwhile, the presiding judge at the trial, Leg Svc LtCol F. Lisunov had the precise information: Lunde had been punished several times, including punishments for drinking....

Lunde's entire outward appearance showed that he was not concerned about Radzhabov's case. It seemed as though he did not understand why the judge questioned him longer than he did the criminal Radzhabov and why the prosecutor's summation on the causes of the crime used the word "contributed," i.e., implied that he, Capt Lunde was an accessory to the crime. Lunde stubbornly found no relationship between Radzhabov's crime and the lack of procedures prescribed by regulations in the company he commanded. He was not able to find any direct relationship between Radzhabov's trial and the fact that there is a lack of elementary control over personnel in the company and that individual work is totally suppressed.

But, the pages of the Soviet Armed Forces Administrative Regulations which discuss the company commander's duties frankly state that he is responsible, "...for the indoctrination, military discipline and morale of company personnel..." that he must "...know the official, political and moral traits...as well as...the family status of each serviceman in the company...."

It is not idly said that the company is a single family, the company is home. And, where the family and the home are, is where the father is--the company commander. And, he has paternal duties toward each soldier--this follows from the regulations.

9001
CSO: 1801

LETTERS TO MILITARY UNITS: PROPER HANDLING STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 80 p 2

[Article by Leg Svc LtCol A. Sadolin: "The Commander and the Law: The Unit Received a Letter"]

[Text] Every day, military unit and installation commanders and political officers receive letters in the mail. As a rule, the envelopes do not just contain official correspondence. War veterans and soldiers transferred to the reserve send holiday greetings to their comrades in arms and tell them about their hard-earned successes; the servicemen's mothers and fathers send thanks for their sons' character development; and enterprise executives, collective farm managers and school teachers ask for news on how their former employees and students are serving. Less frequently, there are complaints and requests for assistance. And, at times, the writer reporting a deficiency will recommend steps to correct it as an interested citizen.

This is special mail since these are real people with their thoughts, concerns, worries, joys and sorrows. These letters are true human documents, as Vladimir Il'ich Lenin called them. There should be a special attitude toward these letters--an attentive, careful, kind attitude; and, the answer to each letter should be efficient and well-reasoned so the person is completely satisfied.

As a lawyer, I should emphasize that the procedures for handling letters are set by a special 12 April 1968 Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. On 4 March 1980, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decreed that changes and additions derived from the USSR Constitution be made to the Ukase. They approved a new version of the Ukase "On Procedures for Handling Citizens' Suggestions, Requests and Grievances." These procedures are the law which must be carried out by all officials, including all commanders and officers in charge, as their party duty.

I know a lot of commanders who understand that when a serviceman or a member of his family sends them a request or a letter, it is an expression of their trust and confidence that the request will be reviewed objectively. Everyday, these commanders study the letters and requests they receive and they take well-considered, proper action on them. An example of this attitude toward an important area of our work is LtCol G. Petrov, a motorized rifle regiment commander. He always goes through his daily mail carefully and then decides which letters he will do himself and which he will assign to other officers to handle. Due to his high standards and personal example, the unit does not have any violations of letter handling deadlines and, just as important, it does not have any follow-on complaints.

The commander and his deputies organize discussions on the topics in the small units and question and answer sessions in the evenings and invite administrative officers, lawyers and doctors to them. Meetings with military dependents are traditional. Officer Petrov focuses an especially large amount of attention on analyzing the complaints and the causes for them. After all, if effective action is not taken to correct these causes immediately, if a conciliatory attitude is shown toward violations or if the unscrupulous official being complained about is protected, this may give rise to a lack of responsibility or impunity, may undermine discipline or lead to other undesirable consequences.

I want to reiterate that this is how the over-whelming majority of our commanders act; they have a marvelous understanding of the importance of this work and they recognize that there is a person behind each letter. But, I would like to turn the discussion to the people who have not adopted strict, precise implementation of the procedures and rules for handling letters as the standard for their official performance.

Unfortunately, it is not necessary to look far for examples.

When he transferred to the reserves, WO N. Shubenikov was not given his military record and his personnel file was not sent to the military commissariat. Comrade Shubenikov wrote to the commander three times, asked that the documents be sent and explained that he could not register or get a job without them. It was all in vain. Finally, he appealed to the Ministry of Defense during reception hours. The commander received instructions to send the documents immediately. But, the unit was in no hurry. It was only a month later, after a second request, that the documents were received. The red tape stretched out for exactly six months. You would think they would have profited from this lesson, would have put their procedures in order

and would have punished the guilty parties. The "procedures" stayed the same. On 4 February 1979, serviceman I. Kovalev's mother requested that the commander send her a certificate that her son was serving in the Soviet Army. She waited and waited but never received an answer.

This is not just scandalous indifference or a lack of concern for the individual, it is a flagrant violation of the law. After all, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's Ukase "On Procedures for Handling Citizens' Suggestions, Requests and Grievances" states that all letters, grievances and requests will be taken care of no later than 15 days after their arrival. The Ministry of Defense Order makes it mandatory for commanders and officers in charge to consider letter handling and receiving visitors as an important area of their party and official activities. They are personally responsible for organizing the reception of visitors and letter handling at subordinate military units and installations. It is mandatory that the commander personally make the decisions on letters and follow up on these decisions, guided strictly by the law and orders.

You would think that everything is perfectly clear. But, then, the commander of Unit X received a letter from an active veteran of the last war, N. Suprun. The veteran talked about the combat record and feats of his frontline friends and requested some news, no matter how brief, about how his son was doing in the service and what advice he needed. Without digging into the letter or appreciating its significance, the commander gave it to his political officer, Capt A. Kopteyev. Another, more experienced political officer would have seen this as a valuable godsend and would have organized a discussion of the letter in the unit. After all, this kind of letter is rare now; the majority of the fathers of today's soldiers did not fight in the war.

If Capt Kopteyev had done this, the frontline soldier's letter would have played a large role in personnel indoctrination. But, the political officer turned the document over to SrLt V. Chernayayev,who was responsible for handling paperwork and advised him to inform the veteran that his son was alive, healthy and doing okay in the service. Chernayayev turned out to be even less obliging: he did not even deign to register the letter, without even mentioning the fact that the frontline soldier did not receive any answer from the unit.

Two different units, two commanders but the same style in handling letters--a proforma, bureaucratic style. As it was discovered later, both units were neglecting to account for the letters and grievances and there was no supervision over the paperwork even though it is mandatory for

the commander to make a self-inspection of the status of letter handling at least once per quarter.

When you encounter such cases, you automatically ask yourself: why aren't the commanders and political officers of the units where such a bureaucratic attitude toward letters and grievances flourishes punished or held strictly accountable by their senior commanders? Of course, in each case like this, we military lawyers make a written statement for the senior commanders. However, I don't remember a case where any of the commanders had proceedings instituted against them. A violation of procedures prescribed by regulations for reviewing letters, red tape and a bureaucratic attitude toward suggestions, requests and grievances should entail nonjudicial punishment for the guilty parties. This action should be primarily used for people who commit the violation deliberately, negligently or out of a lack of discipline.

But, there are also other causes. LtCol N. Dudin received a letter from Pvt D. Saranchev's former wife requesting that he send her a certificate to fill out for child support. A copy of the son's birth certificate and a copy of the divorce papers were attached to the letter. The officer replied: "I cannot send the certificate since it is not authorized." In reality, it is mandatory that he send this certificate. This is patent ignorance of basic rights and responsibilities; it is bad legal information. A less experienced person could be excused for this blunder and required to study the governing documents. But, these kinds of mistakes are frequently commited by our experienced comrades. Naturally, this is unforgiveable in their case.

Careful, efficient handling of letters and a knowledge of the rules and requirements are the commander's personal jobs; it is his official duty and responsibility, the standards for which are set by regulations, orders, directives and our legislation. In a number of cases, a violation of these norms can lead to malfeasance in office and may entail criminal punishment. Senior commanders are obligated to see to it that their subordinate commanders have good legal training and systematically supplement their legal knowledge.

A timely, proper reaction to suggestions and complaints from servicemen, their dependents, Soviet Army and Navy civilian employees and other citizens promotes stronger military and work discipline, law and order and the rule of law among the troops. The job of handling letters is the duty and responsibility of the commander, officer in charge or political officer, regardless of the position he occupies.

9001
CSO: 1801

NAVAL OFFICER CANDIDATES: SELECTION PROCEDURES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Jun 80 p 2

[Article by Vice-Adm A. Kosov, deputy commander-in-chief for naval educational institutions and chief of naval educational institutions: "Who Should Be a Naval Officer? Some Problems Related to the Vocational and Psychological Selection of Young People for Naval Schools"]

[Text] Very likely nearly all young people wanting to enter higher naval educational institutions are asked by members of the admissions commission the stereotyped, but by no means idle question: What dictates your aspiration? In a number of cases, the fairly common answers follow: "I want to be a naval officer"... ..."The naval engineer profession appeals to me." From subsequent interviews it becomes apparent that various applicants have an extremely superficial picture of both future service and the difficulties inevitably linked with it. They do not realize that to be a "romantic of the sea" in spirit is still far from an adequate basis for selecting the profession.

Nowadays, those who decide to become naval officers face exceptionally high requirements, dictated by objective circumstances.

In a brief historical period the modern Soviet Navy has changed beyond recognition. From a coastal navy, it has been transformed into an ocean navy capable of handling strategic missions. The speed and range of ships has increased; their combat employment efficiency has increased and consequently, the burden on the personnel increased with it. This circumstance considerably increases the need for officer cadres and dictates the necessity for the most painstaking selection of personnel for naval service.

Unfortunately, we have available facts which attest to the errors made by young people in their selection of a naval officer career. Their original error lay in their ignorance of the specifics of naval service. I'll make reference to but a single such example. Here is how a ship's captain rated a naval school graduate, Lieutenant S., after having known him more than a year. "His reactions are slow... Under tough conditions, he gets flustered; he doesn't have a special love of the sea; he has

little initiative...." Naval service required that the lieutenant pass the final examination--that of professional fitness. This young officer failed.

The question arises: Is it not possible to schedule the test of professional competence, partially if not totally, during an earlier period, say, at the time of entry into school? Modern psychological science and experimental research practice in the fields of vocational and psychological selection say: yes, it is possible.

By the first year at naval educational institutions, the vocational and psychological selection of candidates is being made. Such selection involves a system of measures directed at the practical identification of persons who, by their moral, political, practical and psychophysiological characteristics, are stand-outs at the time of their admission and, to the greatest extent possible, meet the qualifications required of a naval officer. Candidates recognized by their vocational and psychological characteristics as being unfit for training are not allowed to compete.

In the system of vocational selection several stages are involved. Initially, comprehensive work is done to attract the greatest number of candidates to the school. With the aim of raising the system's effectiveness, we assigned zones of activity for groups of officers and cadets in kray, oblast' and rayon military registration and enlistment offices, in the party and Komsomol organizations, at enterprises and in schools of 350 cities of the country. In the course of 5 months of last year, representatives from the naval educational institutions took part in dozens of telecasts and prepared 280 articles on schools for kray and oblast newspapers for young people.

The task of the next (basic) stage in the selection process is the identification of candidates who, in line with the requisite qualities, were stand-outs when compared with the rest of the persons taking the entrance examinations. During this period at our schools a broad complex of methods procedures is used. It is based upon the rational combination of traditional selection methods with such techniques as the completion of questionnaires, testing, the careful analysis of documents, personal interviews, psychological and pedagogical observation, etc. And the special finding made was the following.

Whereas previously the matter of the acceptance or rejection of candidates was decided on the basis of the entrance examination grades, taking into account their state of health, now other important factors are being considered: motivation toward scholastic instruction, the level of development of practical, physical and psychological qualities. Last year up to 20 percent of the enrollees, on the basis of these factors, were not accepted in the schools.

The testing and evaluation of the psychophysiological qualities of the candidates is of special interest. Here also, various methods are used--

observation, interviews, among them, individual interviews; the completion of questionnaires, analytical tests (with test forms), examinations with test apparatuses. Reliable, scientifically-based methods which have undergone many years of experimental testing are employed for determining characteristics in thinking, attentiveness, psychomotor activities, and emotional and volitional stability. The selection results for 1979, using such a system, confirm that there is a great future ahead for vocational-psychological testing.

As a result of the next stage--the integration of educational subunits, taking into account specialization requirements--there is amassed reference data for the purposeful development of the future officer's professional fitness.

From the time of their selection or school up to the time of their graduation, special importance is attached to the consideration of the dynamics of the professionally significant qualities of future officers. For that purpose there has been developed and introduced a special "chart of the dynamics of developing the professionally required qualities of the student" which covers the entire 5-year period of schooling.

Of course, the vocational-psychological selection results are not immediately apparent. They make their presence felt throughout the entire cycle of scholastic education and service aboard ships. But today we can already speak about the appraisal of last year's selection process, and about the effect it had on the instructional and educational process. In spite of being virtually the first experiment, its results are convincing: violations of military discipline declined, first year dismissals were reduced, and the success rate increased.

We view vocational selection as one of the elements of a unified system for developing the professional fitness of future naval officer cadres, that is, we are proceeding on the basis of an integrated (systematic) approach to the educational and training process.

Included under professional fitness for the performance of a naval officer's duties, there is a complex of professionally requisite qualities, skills, practices and abilities combined with high-level communist conviction, an active attitude toward life, organization, psychological stability, good health and physical fitness.

The CPSU program states that the party "will tirelessly concern itself about the training of command, political and technical cadres for the Army and Navy, composed of the finest representatives of the Soviet people who are wholeheartedly devoted to the cause of communism." This party program requirement obligates everyone entrusted with the training of junior officer cadres to manage the process of selection, education and training of cadets in such a way that they will be able to assimilate a large volume of knowledge, acquire the necessary skills and abilities and become full-fledged officers, capable of giving their utmost for the defense of our socialist homeland.

CSO: 1801

ARMED FORCES: MORALE AND COMBAT READINESS DISCUSSED

LD080829 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Jul 80 pp 2-3

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Maj Gen Prof A. Milovidov, RSFSR honored scientist, under the rubric "Social Facets of Military Organizational Development": "The Morale Factor in Combat Readiness"]

[Text] The present-day development and improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces is being effected in complete accord with the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and its guidelines on the further strengthening of our state's defense capability. This applies both to equipping the army and navy with modern weapons and combat equipment and to improving the quality of combat training and ideological tempering of the personnel.

Accumulated experience, which is bound to be comprehensively analyzed in the course of preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress, indicated that the solution of the diverse tasks of Soviet military organizational development is inextricably linked to instilling lofty moral and political qualities in the army and navy personnel. And this is natural: troops' morale has always been one of the main indicators of their combat capability. Now its role is even greater in view of the heightened significance of moral principles in social awareness and, at the same time, the more complex and wider nature of problems relating to ensuring the reliable defense of the motherland and the gains of socialism and communism and the very acute nature of the struggle between the two opposing systems, the two ideologies--socialist and bourgeois.

The growth of the role and significance of the morale factor in the combat capability and combat readiness of our armed forces is also governed by the truly revolutionary changes in the actual business of being a soldier. Soviet troops handle very complex combat vehicles, missile systems and radio electronic systems, control nuclear submarines and supersonic aircraft and master methods of using a variety of other military equipment in combat. This is the result of the heightened demands currently being made on the vocational expertise of servicemen and their moral and political qualities.

"The fundamental changes that have taken place in recent years in the military and technical provision of the forces and in the nature and methods of combat actions," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "make far greater demands on the moral and political training of the personnel.

A high degree of organization, unwavering self-discipline and faultless performance by all personnel are of exceptional importance. Even isolated manifestations of carelessness and indiscipline on the part of servicemen may result in serious consequences. The level of combat capability and combat readiness in subunits, units and on ships, as was noted at a recent conference of army and navy leading command and political personnel, is directly dependent on the political morale of the forces, on the morale factor.

The political morale of the USSR Armed Forces is a combination of the political and moral ideas and feelings with which the troops are imbued and which express their attitude toward the interests of the motherland and the people and toward the sociopolitical system and policy of the state, and, in time of war, their attitude toward its goals. The state of the troops and naval forces is manifested in the specific actions, behavior and deeds of the personnel.

The high political morale of our people and our armed forces is determined by the socialist social and state system and Marxist-Leninist ideology. It is stable.

At the same time, its moral potential strengthens and improves with the socioeconomic progress of Soviet society. Of course, this has a most positive effect on the political morale of the Soviet Armed Forces. But it is not an automatic influence. The lofty moral and political state of the forces is achieved through purposeful ideological and educational work which, as was pointed out at the conference of army and navy leading command and political personnel, should be organically bound up with the demands and practical solution of tasks of increasing combat readiness.

The constant combat readiness of the army and navy is the main, determining indicator of the might of the armed forces. Combat readiness encapsulates the people's immense efforts and material outlays on equipping the army, the consciousness, expertise and discipline of all servicemen, the command personnel's art of handling the forces and a great many other things besides. Combat readiness is the culmination of the troops' expertise in peacetime and the key to victory in armed struggle. The basic requirement as far as combat readiness is concerned is that its level should guarantee, as the USSR constitution prescribes, an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

This level is attained by fully providing units and formations with personnel, first-class weapons and combat equipment in constant working order and ready for immediate use. Other constituents of combat readiness are first-class training of forces, physical tempering of personnel, coordination of units and formations, the requisite training of command and political cadres and so forth. But to attain the desired level of combat readiness you need another absolutely vital ingredient--high morale. In other words, combat readiness incorporates the morale factor as an integral component and presupposes its active utilization.

It is appropriate to note that the actual concept of "the morale factor in combat readiness" is scarcely ever encountered in the press or in speeches. I think this is wrong. Are we not making use of the pertinent moral forces, levers, stimuli to ensure constant combat readiness and to raise its level? Of course we are, every day in fact. Evidence of this is the great work done, for example, among missile men before they go on duty or during watches and among seamen before and during ocean voyages. Here, and not only here, the morale factor in combat readiness is taken into account and used to the fullest.

Our military scientific literature generally sees the morale factor in terms of conditions of armed struggle. Yet it operates and very actively, in peacetime conditions too. Especially today when the demand for constant combat readiness extends more widely than before to all branches of the armed forces and categories of troops and, in accordance with this demand, units, ships and formations must be ever ready to deliver an immediate and decisive rebuff to any aggressor and all their activity is developed in an atmosphere as close as possible to actual combat.

As some of our authors corr[illegible]ly note, the criteria for assessing the level of moral, political and psychological preparation of personnel for waging armed struggle and for carrying out everyday service in peacetime have drawn significantly closer together now in a certain sense. Today the situation has arisen where if imperialism unleashes a war against our country, there could be no time for the moral and psychological restructuring of troops and naval forces. Many of them will become engaged in hostilities in an extremely short space of time. Hence, the high demands on their combat readiness. This applies first and foremost to the missile forces, the country's air defense forces, nuclear submarines and missile-carrying aircraft. Here the very tenor and organization of day-to-day service, the whole course of educational work are aimed at achieving such a degree of vigilance, such an intensity of forces and will among personnel as to ensure readiness every hour and every minute for effective combat operations. Experience already accumulated in peacetime conditions, it was noted at a conference of leading command and political personnel of the army and navy, leads to an understanding of how the training and education of personnel must be organized so as to bring them as close as possible to modern demands.

What has been said applies also to work in further strengthening the morale of troops and naval forces. Even in peacetime the morale factor in the troops' combat readiness plays a part close to wartime conditions. Of course, this proximity cannot be regarded as absolute, just as the conditions of peacetime and wartime cannot be considered equivalent. But in both cases morale among troops and naval forces is a very important element in their combat might and combat readiness.

The structure of the morale factor consists of two closely interrelated, large groups of elements--ideological elements and social and psychological elements. The first group includes Leninist ideas on servicemen in

defense of freedom, the independence of the socialist fatherland and the gains of socialism, on the historical purpose and patriotic and international mission of the USSR Armed Forces, and so forth. The second group embraces traditions and customs, people's patriotic feelings and sentiments in relation, above all, to the defense of the motherland, practical experience of this defense and others.

In the system of all these elements a leading role is played by the ideological, world-outlook component. Marxist-Leninist ideology--a scientific theory tested by the experience of socialism and providing an objective true picture of the world--offers reliable guidelines in practical activity and is a powerful source of high morale among the Soviet people and their armed forces. That is why all the activity of commanders, political workers and party organizations in strengthening troops' morale is based on ideological and political education work.

The main avenues of this work at the present stage and ways of increasing its effectiveness were defined by the 25th CPSU Congress and concretized in the decisions of subsequent plenums and CPSU Central Committee resolutions and in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's works and speeches. The problem of the comprehensive approach to the cause of education has received all-round substantiation: this involves insuring the close unity of political, labor and moral education with respect to different groups of Soviet people. Of course, this also serves to strengthen our society's moral potential, and therefore to strengthen morale in the Soviet Armed Forces and increase the effectiveness of the morale factor in resolving the tasks which face us.

Certainly success in this matter is conditioned by a high scientific level and a businesslike and concrete approach in propaganda and agitation and further development of their militancy. That is, it is conditioned by the resolution, without fail, of the urgent tasks defined by the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Education Work." The core of this work, the resolution stresses, has been and remains the formation among our people of a scientific world outlook, selfless devotion to the party's cause and to communist ideals, love for the socialist fatherland and proletarian internationalism.

Political ideology and morality are two aspects of social consciousness. The active significance of morality is determined by a system of moral norms and principles governing people's behaviour on the social plane and their attitude to society as a whole. Here the main criterion of Soviet man's high moral qualities is his active participation in the struggle for the victory of communism and defense of its gains and his political position. In terms of military service such activity must be manifested concretely in the struggle to maintain the constant combat readiness of the army and navy forces. The servicemen's understanding of the fact that the level of combat readiness determined the Soviet state's security and, thus, the implementation of the tasks of building communism, determines the ability of army and navy personnel to withstand any stresses in its name. This is a most important indicator of the strength of morale.

Of course, none of this detracts from the morale factor's socio-psychological aspect which is shaped to a significant extent under the direct influence of the concrete social milieu. Under army and navy conditions this means under the influence of the whole tenor of service, which is a remarkable school of labor and military training, of moral purity and courage and of patriotism and comradeship, the Soviet armed forces are resolving a dual task of great social importance. They vigilantly guard the Soviet people's peaceful labor and the gains of socialism and communism and play an ever-increasing educational role in our society.

New weapons and new military hardware have a considerable influence on improving the armed forces and their combat readiness. They are introducing major changes in troop organization, the forms and methods of combat operations and the system of training and educating personnel. However, military activity has a certain individuality of its own, its own internal structure and logic of development, and its own mechanism for quantitative and qualitative changes. If this mechanism is "unprepared" to accept new weaponry it is difficult and sometimes impossible to achieve the desired result.

This readiness will be all the higher the deeper the Soviet servicemen's realization of the need for skillful mastery of all the new types of combat hardware and weaponry in the face of imperialism's ever present aggressive threat. A correct understanding of measures taken in this respect is an important indicator of the strength of troop morale and of a conscientious attitude toward keeping the troops in a state of constant combat readiness. At the same time on the moral plane inculcating in personnel a liking of their weaponry and instilling the confidence in its combat potential are of great significance.

Modern weaponry has a more important influence on the organization of all military labor and all service. New interrelations have been established between man and machinery; the role of intellectual, mental labor has grown; psychological loads on personnel have increased and great precision and operational efficiency have been demanded of military experts' actions.

All this finds concentrated expression in the forces' moral state and in the morale factor of combat readiness and must not fail to be taken into account in the training and educating of personnel.

Modern weaponry is weaponry involving collective manning and utilization. Consequently, the moral climate and psychological staunchness of the troop collective have the most direct influence on the level of combat readiness. The establishment of correct mutual relations between servicemen at all levels and the development of comradeship, mutual aid and mutual assistance are the perpetual task of army and navy commanders, political workers and party organizations.

As experience attests, much depends here on the style of work of our military cadres and on the personal exemplariness of the officer corps. Firm regulation-based order, accuracy and organization in combat training and service, soundness and competence in the decisions taken by the commander, unyielding exactingness and unremitting concern for his subordinates--all this creates a businesslike frame of mind in the troop collective. Unity between word and deed in an officer's activity is of great significance on the moral plane.

Active and purposeful party political work embracing all categories of servicemen has decisive influence on the personnel's morale and the level of combat readiness. This is a question not just of educational activity but also of the political approach to the problems of combat training and combat readiness and of providing the political backup for their solution. In recent years much has been done in this respect. But improving party-political work and increasing its efficiency is a continuous process. A broad field of activity and new possibilities are opening up before army and navy communists in connection with the preparations for the next, 26th, CPSU Congress.

The preparations for the congress constitute a powerful lever for boosting the political and labor activity of both communists and nonparty people. Precongress socialist competition, which encapsulates a great moral potential, has been launched on a broad scale among the troops and in the fleets. It is a matter of fully utilizing the educational force of competition in the interests of further increasing the combat readiness of subunits, units, ships and formations.

The level of combat readiness depends directly on the state of military discipline. In the work to further strengthen it a whole series of new circumstances must now be taken into account: qualitative changes in enlisted personnel, the increase in the army and navy's technical equipment level and, consequently, the increased significance of technical discipline; the bringing of current disciplinary requirements closer to wartime requirements, which is manifested, for example, in the discipline of combat tours of duty; the collective nature of weapon utilization and the increased social role and responsibility of every serviceman in this common cause.

All educational work in the armed forces is now aimed at ensuring a considerable personal contribution by every serviceman to maintaining constant combat readiness.

The remarkable moral-political qualities of the motherland's armed defenders are manifesting themselves with new force during the preparations for the Leninist party's 26th congress. Soviet servicemen warmly approve and unanimously support the party's domestic and foreign policy. They have taken as a guide to action the CPSU Central Committee June (1980) Plenum's

conclusion that the intrigues of imperialism and the other enemies of peace demand constant vigilance and the comprehensive strengthening of our state's defense capability.

The USSR Armed Forces are always ready to immediately repulse any aggressor from wherever he might appear. The Soviet people's peaceful labor, our socialist homeland and the gains of socialism and communism have a reliable defense.

CSO: 1801

CONSTRUCTION WORKERS' DAY: GENERAL SHESTOPALOV ARTICLE

LD151053 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Col Gen Engr N. F. Shestopalov, USSR deputy minister of defense for construction and billeting of troops: "The Military Construction Workers' Lofty Duty"]

[Text] Every year, on the second Sunday in August, our country marks construction workers' day. The Soviet people pay a tribute of respect to those who construct plants and factories, power stations and highways, who lay oil pipelines and build canals and who erect apartment blocs and buildings for social, cultural and consumer purposes. In terms of the scale of industrial, housing and cultural and consumer service construction the Soviet Union has no equal in the world. In the first 4 and 1/2 years of the 10th Five-Year Plan alone more than 1,000 major industrial enterprises have been commissioned in our country. Soviet people have received more than 200,000 new apartments.

A weighty contribution is made to the achievements of the millions-strong army of Soviet construction workers by workers on military construction projects, who together with all the Soviet people and army and navy servicemen are marking their professional holiday today. This year the holiday has special features--it is the year of the Lenin jubilee, the 35th anniversary of victory and the year of active preparation for the 26th CPSU Congress.

And military construction workers are marking all these events with new labor achievements. The plan for the first 4 years of the five-year plan were fulfilled for the main indicators, tasks set for the commissioning of the most important defense projects were resolved and Olympic projects were constructed or modernized to a high standard and on time. Plan targets for the first 6 months of 1980 were fulfilled on time, and they were overfulfilled in terms of the commissioning of fixed capital and housing construction. Billeting and maintenance organs have also worked well.

An example of creative labor is set by the collectives of military construction workers of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District and the Red Banner Pacific and twice Red Banner Baltic fleets and the

construction organizations headed by comrades V. Arnauta, V. Bezmenov, Yu. Rossomakhov and N. Gaponenko. All these and other construction collectives have been awarded challenge red banners of the USSR Defense Ministry and the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Workers in construction and the construction materials industry. The design organizations headed by comrades S. Voinov, Yu. Kudryavtsev, V. Pershin and V. Manoylin coped successfully with their targets.

Socialist competition is a powerful tool in the communist education of people and the successful fulfillment of plan targets by military construction workers. It has assumed a wide scale in the Lenin jubilee year on the initiative of the Pacific fleet construction collective under the slogan "Working Stock Fashion, Working in Leninist Style." Active participation in competition helped many workers on military construction sites, teams, sectors and shops to complete the five-year plan by 22 April. The very best were awarded Leninist testimonials of honor. A number of labor collectives fulfilled five-year plan targets by the 35th anniversary of victory or by today's holiday.

Socialist competition at military construction sites took on new scope as a result of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee June (1980) Plenum. Warmly and unanimously supporting the CPSU's domestic and foreign policy, military construction workers have adopted stepped-up pledges and joined in the nationwide movement "a shock finish for the five-year plan. A fitting greeting for the 26th CPSU Congress." Embarking on a precongress labor watch, many collectives have supported the Muscovites' initiative and given their word to fulfill the 1980 plan by the 63d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Initiators in this movement are the construction organizations headed by Comrades L. Lapshin, V. Voynikov, F. Suchedrunov and others. They have pledged to come to the 26th CPSU Congress with high labor achievements and to create a good basis for work in the 11th Five-Year Plan.

A patriotic initiative has been put forward by the construction industry enterprise collective headed by communist S. Lekhovitskiy. The workers have decided to produce all their above-plan output from savings of material and labor resources, and to work with saved raw material and electricity on the opening day of the 26th party congress. Detachments' Komsomol organizations have joined actively in the All-Union relay race of shock deeds by young people: "26 shock weeks to the 26th CPSU Congress!"

The fulfillment of plans for 1980 and the five-year plan as a whole must be carried out in the light of the demands of party and government resolutions on improving the economic machinery and improving planting, which provide for a number of measures to further improve the economic machinery in construction. A major reserve for increasing labor productivity, improving the quality and stepping up the rate of construction lies in the wide utilization of the achievements of science and

technology and in constantly increasing the scale of the introduction of progressive developments. In recent years our scientific research organizations have carried out research whose results have made it possible to improve the planning and organization of construction working, and economic and mathematical methods of management of construction work using computers are being introduced persistently.

Advanced technology is being used increasingly on military construction sites--the use of larger units of construction elements and equipment, and modular assembly. The scale of introduction of load-bearing and screening structures and articles made from light concretes is increasing. The volume of use of economical materials--high grade cements, wide-flanged h-beams, dry plaster--is increasing, much is also being done to improve the military construction workers' working and living conditions. This is promoted by the assimilation of a new kind of prefabricated and dismantlable structures of the panel and upright [panelno-stoyechnyy] type, and new models of temporary buildings have been designed and put into series production.

The vanguard role in all the multifaceted activity of construction and billeting organs in successfully completing the 10th Five-Year Plan belongs to communists. The political directorate of military construction units, political organs and party organizations direct the political, organizational and educational work of the personnel of labor collectives and trade union and Komsomol organizations toward increasing the efficiency of construction work and improving work quality, accelerating labor productivity growth, ensuring strict observance of the policy of thrift and strengthening military and labor discipline.

In the light of the demands of the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Further Improving Ideological and Political Education Work," the generalization and introduction of leading experience has become an object of special concern for communists on military construction sites. Carefully, little by little, they collect all that is new and advanced that emerges in everyday life in military and labor collectives and generalize and disseminate this experience. Construction collectives have begun to assess their achievements, shortcomings and omissions more critically and to adopt flexible measures to eliminate them.

Major work is taking place to increase the educational role of military service in military construction units. Commanders, political organs and party organizations are doing a great deal to ensure that military construction workers are not only highly qualified specialists but also spiritually tempered and that they grow morally. In a planned, persistent way they develop among them an active life stance and a sense of collectivism, mutual assistance and pride in the results of their activity.

We take legitimate pride in the successes of workers on military construction sites, but at the same time we still have considerable unexploited reserves. The problem of the rapid introduction of the team contract in construction work is urgent. The rate of growth of Zlobin teams in military construction units is still rather lower than the interests of the task require. Certain leaders are unwilling to create contract teams.

Scientific research organizations and higher military construction schools are still insufficiently aware of this problem. Construction sites await their active assistance in developing new recommended methods, normative documents and generalized experience.

Improving the standard of engineering leadership is a very important task for leaders of construction sites, political organs and party organizations. We must not reconcile ourselves to the fact that in some places flexible production planning is still poorly organized and schedules for construction work and the utilization of machinery and deliveries of materials and structures are not concretely connected.

The production base has a great influence on the successful fulfillment of capital construction plans. We have a reliable base, but there are considerable reserves here too. For instance, in the construction directorates of the far eastern and Transbaykal military districts and the northern fleet a significant proportion of resources allocated for the modernization and expansion of production capacities has not been assimilated in the last 4 years, which is having a negative effect on material and technical provision for construction projects. We regard the resolution of this task as an important means of further improving the construction process.

There are great reserves for increasing construction efficiency in planning. But they are still being implemented only slowly. Some documentation is drawn up to a low standard, overstating of estimated costs is drawn up to a low standard, overstating of estimated costs is permitted and design schedules are excessively protracted. There are also shortcomings in the planning of design and survey work. The timely commissioning of the full range of projects for all clients requires unremitting attention. It must be confessed that there are still leaders who focus all their efforts on the main projects and forget about "trifles"--projects which are not indicative for the plan. This connection, tasks in reducing the level of uncompleted construction are being resolved only slowly. All this results from the fragmentation of capital investments, the growth of estimated costs, poor organization of production and labor, not totally efficient cooperation among all components of the construction process, and also less than irreproachable material and technical supply.

As yet not all construction organizations are working steadily and many have great difficulties in fulfilling commissioning plans.

In certain military construction subunits military and labor discipline is still at a low level. This applies to Transbaykal Military District and northern fleet construction organizations. Existing shortcomings in capital construction and the low standard of military discipline are the consequence of certain omissions both in the organization of production and of military construction workers' labor and life, and in the

organization of political education work, particularly in multinational collectives. All construction site leaders, political organs and party, trade union and Komsomol organizations and all personnel must work very intensively up to the end of the year.

Military construction workers will make every effort to cope successfully with the tasks set, will make a worthy contribution to the cause of strengthening the country's defense capability and increasing the Soviet Armed Forces' combat readiness and will greet the 26th party congress in a fitting manner.

CSO: 1801 END

END OF FICHE DATE FILMED

Sept. 29, 1980